APPROVED FOR USE
CYCLE 146A-1 ONLY
SIGNATURE [illegible]
DATE 2/13/10

CRD-1 PISAs With Active Interim Controls

PISA	Interim Control(s)	Implementation Method
TRA-USQ-SE-2003-145 TRA-USQ-SE-2004-214 R1 TRA-USQ-SE-2004-396 TRA-USQ-SE-2004-413	Depressurized reactor operation prohibited. (SEE EDF-5614 R1)	DOPs 7.10.45 and 7.10.46 in SUSPENDED status
TRA-USQ-2004-385	Maintain surge tank level > 45%, vice TSR required >28%	RP-1243A
RTC-USQ-2005-248	RMSS setpoints cannot be raised above the current procedural value (45 MR/HR)	DOP-7.9.25
TRA-USQ-2006-376	No safety related setpoint changes are allowed without Nuclear Engineering and SORC review.	JCC-02-05 (copy attached)
RTC-USQ-2006-577	SCS activity limited to 100 cpm above background	DOP-6.1.1
RTC-USQ-2006-578	Reactor operation is not allowed when <2σ from beryllium cracking, or if cracks in the beryllium are observed	CSAP

CRD-1 PISAs With Active Interim Controls

PISA	Interim Control(s)	Implementation Method
RTC-USQ-2006-655	The reactor shall be operated with the following limits on ATR fuel element effective plate powers (EPPs): For ≥ 2 standard deviations to reflector ligament cracking: 3 PCP operations plate 19 EPP ≤ to 387 MW; 3 PCP operations inner plates EPP ≤385 MW; 2 PCP operations plate 19 EPP ≤362 MW; 2 PCP operations inner plates EPP ≤362 MW. For < 2 standard deviations to reflector ligament cracking: 3 PCP operations plate 19 EPP ≤310 MW; 3 PCP operations inner plates EPP ≤310 MW; 2 PCP operations plate 19 EPP ≤311 MW; 2 PCP operations inner plates EPP ≤354 MW.	**CSAP**
RTC-USQ-2007-726	Any failure of HVS-1 which result in a building under-pressure will require the following: • If the reactor is in an outage, a building leak-rate test is to be performed prior to entering confinement applicability. • If the reactor is in operation, walk-down of the accessible areas to inspect for damaged confinement will be performed • Perform a building leak-rate test prior to the next scheduled reactor startup.	**AOP-20.2**
RTC-USQ-2008-137	The TSR Section 3.1.1 (Table 3.1.1-1) response times for nuclear instrumentation are reduced by 2 ms to account for uncertainty in the RCCC release time measurement. The TSR Section 3.7.1 (Table 3.7.1-1) release times are reduced by 2 ms to account for uncertainty in the RCCC release time measurement. The drop times are reduced by 5 ms for pressurized operation and 8 ms for depressurized operation to account for uncertainty in the RCCC release time measurement (2 ms) and the discrepancy in the release time requirement (3 ms pressurized, 6 ms depressurized).	**DOP-7.1.9**
ATR Complex-USQ-2009-320	Verify that M-10 is the running ECP during power operations and for 30 minutes following power operations.	**OMM-7.3.13.1.2** **OMM-7.3.13.1.37** **DOP-7.1.4** **RP-0020**

CRD-1 PISAs With Active Interim Controls

PISA	Interim Control(s)	Implementation Method
RTC-USQ-2008-451 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT Addendum	To ensure that facility operations remain within the safety basis analysis: Heavy-facility-loads handling is allowed in the ATRC bay a) with two bulkheads with pressurized air seals isolating the irradiated fuel storage section of the ATR canal from the load handling; or b) with one bulkhead with dual, independent pressurized air seals isolating the irradiated fuel storage section and implementation of the following surveillances. The ATRC canal bulkhead can be used as one of the isolating bulkheads. Cask and heavy-load handling is allowed at the CTS a) with two bulkheads with pressurized air seals isolating the irradiated fuel storage section; or b) with one bulkhead with dual, independent pressurized air seals isolating the irradiated fuel storage section and implementation of the following surveillances. Cask and heavy-load handling is allowed in the ATR canal with one bulkhead with dual, independent pressurized air seals isolating the irradiated fuel storage section from the load handling area and implementation of the surveillances. Dual, independent pressurized seal bulkhead surveillances: The following initial and periodic checks of seal performance shall be performed: Upon installation, verify acceptable leakage into the gap between the dual seals on the isolation bulkhead. At the beginning of lift operations and each 24 hours thereafter during lift operations, visually check for excessive leakage of air from each seal (e.g., bubbles and other abnormal conditions, such as the detection of excessive air flow). At the beginning of lift operations and each 24 hours thereafter during lift operations, verify the inflation pressure of each seal is within normal range using the pressure gauge installed for that purpose. This pressure shall be compared with the indicated pressure of the down-stream pressure regulator gauge for anomalous differences. All other seal manufacturer surveillance recommendations (inspections, shelf and service life, etc.) are to be implemented. (See TEV-284, Rev. 1 available on EDMS for complete details).	**RP-0630** **RP-1238A** **RP-1238C** **RP-2942** **DOP-4.10.1.9** **DOP-4.10.1.17** **DOP-4.10.2.17** **DOP-4.10.2.18** **DOP-4.10.2.8** **DOP-4.8.3** **DOP-4.8.11** **DOP-4.8.62** **DOP-4.8.64** **DOP-4.20.4.3** **ATRC OP-4.2** **and** **ATRC SED caution tagged to prevent movement** **and** **ICARE 43461**

CRD-1 PISAs With Active Interim Controls

<table>
<tr><th>PISA</th><th>Interim Control(s)</th><th>Implementation Method</th></tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR Complex-
USQ-2009-631</td>
<td>
Interim controls: Primary coolant pH shall be ≥5.0 but ≤5.4.
Applicability: POWER OPERATION
ACTIONS:
<table>
<tr><th>CONDITION</th><th>REQUIRED ACTION</th><th>COMPLETION TIME</th></tr>
<tr><td>A. PCS pH:
≥4.9 but < 5.0
<u>OR</u>
> 5.4 but ≤5.5</td><td>A.1 Restore pH.
<u>OR</u>
A.2.1 Verify reactor scram.
<u>AND</u>
A.2.2 Maintain PCS flow.</td><td>8 Hours

Until SR 4.5.1.2 cooling time is met</td></tr>
<tr><td>B. PCS pH as verified on 2 of 2 or 2 of 3 samples taken at ≤30 minute intervals:
< 4.9
<u>OR</u>
> 5.5</td><td>B.1 Verify reactor scram.
<u>AND</u>
B.2 Maintain PCS flow.
<u>AND</u>
B.3 For low pH, verify the presence of the specified oxide on affected FUEL ELEMENTS ≤1.0 mil for planned operation.</td><td>IMMEDIATELY

Until SR 4.5.1.2 cooling time is met

Prior to reuse of affected FUEL ELEMENTS for POWER OPERATION</td></tr>
</table>
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
<table>
<tr><th>SR #</th><th>SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT</th><th>FREQUENCY</th></tr>
<tr><td>4.3.5.1</td><td>Verify pH by analysis</td><td>Each Shift</td></tr>
<tr><td>4.3.5.2</td><td>Verify recycled FUEL ELEMENTS have <u>NOT</u> been exposed to pH < 4.9 during POWER OPERATION</td><td>Prior to reuse of recycled FUEL ELEMENTS in POWER OPERATION</td></tr>
</table>
</td>
<td>OMM-7.3.13.1.41
OMM-5.1.2.5.1
RP-0018
RP-0021
RP-1200A
RP-1243A
RCRAUX-3</td>
</tr>
</table>

CRD-1 PISAs With Active Interim Controls

PISA	Interim Control(s)	Implementation Method
ATR Complex-USQ-2009-714	"an interim control is required to ensure that Condition 4 events do not result in Significant fuel damage or that an accident-specific radiological analysis be performed (without reliance on the evacuation system sirens) if significant fuel damage is postulated. The follow additional acceptance criterion is to be applied to Condition 4 accident analyses: "For Condition 4 postulated accidents, initiated by a seismic event, new or revised accident analyses implemented into the safety basis shall demonstrate that potential fuel damage is bounded by existing safety basis analyses." "	**CTR-36, "Charter For The ATR Operational Safety Board"**

CRD-1 PISAs With Active Interim Controls

PISA	Interim Control(s)	Implementation Method