[redacted]
S
06/23/2009 09:52 PM

To [redacted]
cc
bcc [redacted]
Subject Fw: Classified Address Check - History & Recommendations

History: This message has been forwarded.

[redacted]

I talked with [redacted] (DOE), [redacted] ([redacted]), and Mark Siciliano today. [redacted] and [redacted] were understanding and supportive.

1. Background:
a) There was request by DoD for Siciliano to brief ATK seniors on DoD Focal Point. DoD program brief, not INL/DOE material (S/NSI).
b) There are separate systems that DOE, DOD, and USG use to track the certification of secure facilities.

c) ATK has different facilities certified by different entities, depending on contracts. Clearfield UT facility has a room for INL (S/RD, recently certified), an area for ORNL (S/RD), and other area(s) for DoD (S/NSI?). Magma UT facility is USG SCIF (not DOE RD).
d) The "Security Assurance" form (471.11) that [redacted] forwarded to [redacted] (who forwarded to DOE) is to transfer certifications from DoD/USG to DOE system, if DOE finds them acceptable. This is the approved process to validate that either DOE personnel clearances or DOE classified materials can be transferred to another facility.
e) Because this form came from yet another ATK facility (Baltimore) it was confused with past requests for INL contracted work in ATK Clearfield facility and meeting requests at Magma facility.
f) [redacted]. DOE does not support shifting the INL portion of work in [redacted] responded to the email in this context.
g) The misunderstandings above degenerated into the email thread below.

Process Recommendations:
A. For non-government facilities where DOE/INL does not have contracting relationship, we should send materials and clearances to our Gov clients whenever possible.
B. In the past, I have talked with [redacted] and [redacted], and now [redacted], on how to make sure that our new DOD/USG clients facilities are verified and loaded into the DOE/INL database of classified addresses. We agree that as part of IWFO start-up checklist that the new "Security Assurance Form" (471.11) should be filed on any new customer addresses. This will push the review of customer addresses to before start of work (and not just before a client meeting).
C. Pure DoD briefs to their contractors are best done by DOD themselves.

2. General Staff Expectations:
a) Early and specific communications with DOE on reasons for any 471.11 requests will help eliminate misunderstandings.
b) Use phone calls and meetings when email chain starts to go south.
c) Maintain "tone" on security requirements.

Relative to Mark
- When I discussed with Mark, he responded in the emails as if he were being accused of being "out of control", and responded inappropriately. He took it personally and should not have.
- We agreed that DoD requests is best left to DoD channels.

I will close further with Dept Managers and key staff on above processes.

Thanks,

I took responsibility and agreed I could have handled it better. [redacted] denies knowledge about any of this. That's an obvious lie.

* Purpose of brief was in brief CEO on FP & Lash up / Collaboration of INL & Socom element.

[redacted]

06/24/2009 02:52 PM

To Mark D Siciliano/SICIMD/CC01/INEEL/US@INEL
cc [redacted]
bcc [redacted]
Subject [redacted] - background / recommendations

This is what I forwarded to [redacted] on history and recommendations ...

In addition we should not be supporting shifting of our Clearfield work to West Virginia (if that comes up) for our current contract.

Background:
a) There was request by DoD for Siciliano to brief ATK seniors on DoD Focal Point. DoD program brief, not INL/DOE material (S/NSI).
b) There are separate systems that DOE, DOD, and USG use to track the certification of secure facilities.

c) ATK has different facilities certified by different entities, depending on contracts. Clearfield UT facility has a room for INL (S/RD, recently certified), an area for ORNL (S/RD [same room as INL?]), and other area(s) for DoD (S/NSI?). Magma UT facility is USG SCIF (not DOE RD).
d) The "Security Assurance" form (471.11) that [redacted] forwarded to [redacted] (who forwarded to DOE) is to transfer certifications from DoD/USG to DOE system, if DOE finds them acceptable. This is the approved process to validate that either DOE personnel clearances or DOE classified materials can be transferred to another facility.
e) Because this form came from yet another ATK facility (Baltimore) it was confused with past requests for INL contracted work in ATK Clearfield facility and meeting requests at Magma facility.
f) In parallel, ATK has been trying to move many of its Clearfield operations to West Virginia. DOE does not support shifting the INL portion of work in Clearfield to West Virginia [redacted] responded to the email in this context.
g) The misunderstandings above degenerated into the email thread below.

Process Recommendations:
A. For non-government facilities where DOE/INL does not have contracting relationship, we should send materials and clearances to our Gov clients whenever possible.
B. In the past, I have talked with [redacted] and [redacted], and now [redacted], on how to make sure that our new DOD/USG clients facilities are verified and loaded into the DOE/INL database of classified addresses. We agree that as part of IWFO start-up checklist that the new "Security Assurance Form" (471.11) should be filed on any new customer addresses. This will push the review of customer addresses to before start of work (and not just before a client meeting).
C. Pure DoD briefs to their contractors are best done by DOD themselves.

[redacted] MADE A big enough ISSUE THAT he HAD WAYNE DO A SUMMARY. [redacted] HAS the ORIGINAL EMAIL TO [redacted] Along with my MID YEAR review THAT [redacted] WROTE ON. He DENIED KNOWING ANYTHING ABOUT THIS.

Contrary to the perception that I don't care about security which is ridiculous.

Mark D Siciliano/SICIMD/CC01/INEEL/US
12/01/2009 04:07 PM

To [redacted]
cc Mark D Siciliano/SICIMD/CC01/INEEL/US
bcc
Subject Fw: Security Diligence

[redacted]

One of many examples of my support and commitment to improving security culture.

Mark

Idaho National Laboratory

Mark Siciliano, Department Manager, Special Programs
National & Homeland Security Directorate
Idaho National Laboratory
P.O. Box 1625, MS-3520, Idaho Falls, ID 83415-3520
O: 208-526-4464, C: 208-360-4367, STE: 208-526-4464
Email: Mark.Siciliano@inl.gov
SIPR: sicilimd@idaho.doe.sgov.gov, IC: idsicmd@doe.ic.gov
(Please call/email if a time critical msg sent to SIPRNET)

—— Forwarded by [redacted] on 09/29/2009 09:00 AM ——

Mark D Siciliano/SICIMD/CC01/INEEL/US
07/08/2009 11:39 AM

To _D620 Org
cc
Subject Security Diligence

Team,

I want to take the opportunity to thank you for your diligence and attention to detail towards security over the past year (365 day rolling calendar). In one year's time, D620 went from the department with the most security infractions to the department with the least. In fact, in the past year, we have had NO security infractions issued to D620 personnel. This has nothing to do with anything I've done, but has EVERYTHING to do with what you have done. You have changed the security culture and awareness from within our organization resulting in a positive and mature outcome.

In my opinion, there are three types of people in the world:

- Those who run to the sound of the guns, take and manage risks, and win the war with diligence and tenacity.

- Those who hunker down at home and support the troops/mission as best they can. (Resourcers if you will)

- And finally, those who flat out run away, are adverse to risk and avoid anything that has the potential to make them look bad. This particular group tends to have the loudest voice, but you will never find them in harm's way. When things get really bad, they blame others or run to Canada.

Although this analogy is clearly from a military perspective, I think at least some elements hold true in our department. I am extremely proud of each and every one of you and I appreciate what you do to support our clients, the Lab's mission as well as each other. National and Homeland Security, creates, handles, transports, disseminates, and destroys more classified media and information than any other Division at the Lab, especially in terms of the shear number of different classified projects and customers we work with. In SP/D620 we conduct our work in various locations, from out at the site, IORC, IWB, IEDF, 611, 627, 1610, 608, SIPR rooms in other buildings, UB3, UB2, and others to include client locations. Our classified business volume along with the personnel working on classified projects have grown exponentially. You all deserve to be recognized for stepping up to the plate, managing the risks, and getting the job done.

Here's what I request you to do:

1. Continue your diligence on security and safety and maintain that questioning attitude.

2. Continue to manage your risks and work with me when things are above your authority or comfort level.

3. Continue to look out for each other and maintain maturity and reasonableness in all that we do.

4. Continue to focus-- maintain clarity and seek peer/manager feedback when you need it. Perhaps even when you think you don't.

5. Help others in the laboratory where you can. Try to maintain a positive attitude as we may be directed to do things that seem (or are) no value added. Admittedly, this is a tough pill for me to swallow, but I have to realize that a large majority of personnel working in the classified realm have never been exposed to it in the past. So what seems over the top to me, might be appropriate to someone working on a classified project for the first time.

6. I need you to help turn some of these new policies into a positive spin with clients. Perhaps instead of saying "I know you don't do this in the (insert 3 letter org here) but since we work with so many different agencies we want to make sure we are protecting your information." Make sense?

7. Welcome the folks from the Wireless Test Bed into UB2 and assist them where you can in terms of security questions.

8. Consider thanking [redacted] for his level headed leadership, guidance, mentoring and help over the last several months as he has improved our understanding of security policies and requirements.

Bottom Line: In order to fix a problem you have to realize you have one. I think we had a problem-- some of it was due to facilities and lack of resources (like SIPR), among other things, but some of our problems were ourselves. It's always been my opinion that most problems are fixed from within, and marginally from above. Again, I appreciate the maturity, diligence and tenacity displayed over the past year. Thank you for taking the extra risks associated with working in our department. The reward is knowing that your work is valuable to the security to our country as well as helping to protect the young warriors that are in harm's way, today. Please keep up the good work.

[redacted]

Mark

Idaho National Laboratory

Mark Siciliano, Department Manager, Special Programs
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O: 208-526-4464, C: 208-360-4367, STE: 208-526-4464
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(Please call/email if a time critical msg sent to SIPRNET)

[redacted]
S
07/29/2009 10:32 AM

To Mark D Sicilliano/SICIMD/CC01/INEEL/US@INEL, [redacted]
cc [redacted]
bcc
Subject Draft DM Recommendations

Contains OUO information

All,

Attached are our draft recommendations to the directors. They are compiled from our discussions with the facilitators, follow-on discussions with [redacted] and [redacted], and refinement by [redacted] and myself to propose specific actions (requested by [redacted] and [redacted]

I am also attaching an electronic copy of the briefing slides we saw in our first meeting with the directors that gave us this assignment (the meeting where they said the managers are not doing their jobs - tell us what you need).

I am scheduling a meeting with all managers for Monday to strategize on our presentation to the directors which is scheduled for Tuesday morning, Aug. 4, 8-10.

This document is draft and needs work in content, language, and planning for presentation. I need the following input from you:

- Review how the value statements for content and how they are currently written. I worked on putting positive, proactive language where I felt I could without losing the message. I think we need to do additional massaging.
- Provide input for specific actions that you need to be more effective.
- Review the intro paragraph for appropriately presenting the recommendations, and for clarity in instruction to the directors on how to read the info.
- Provide your thoughts on HOW you think it would be best to present the recommendations to the directors.

Finally, I suggest that we not lose any of the recommendations (especially after re-reading the briefing slides) as I believe we can only be marginally successful in improving performance if we DON'T address the cultural issues, and I don't get the sense the directors want to take those on (I think this is a consistent perception we've discussed). As [redacted] stated very early on, we need to be able to show that we requested improvements to the underlying management culture that allow us to prevent the next big issue.

Good reading!

[redacted]

ValueStatementsWithSubActions.doc N&HS Security Issues ouo.pdf

[redacted]
National and Homeland Security
Idaho National Laboratory
[redacted]

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT MANAGER PROPOSAL TO DIRECTORS FOR IMPROVING MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS IN N&HS:

The following six value statements describe what we as managers are seeking from our leadership in order to create a highly functional organization that will enable us to perform our jobs effectively. The value statements include recommendations for cultural change as well as specific actionable recommendations. We believe these recommendations are essential to achieve the highly functional organization we want to become, and we are willing to commit our time, with the directors, to implement these recommendations. This commitment includes our time and effort to develop tactics for implementing the recommendations on an agreed-to schedule. One approach would be to hold working sessions with a third-party trained facilitator that includes "homework" and required feedback to the working group. The intended result of this effort is consistency and standardization across N&HS for how we do business.

The value statements are written in first-person and describe the attributes of what we believe is a highly functional organization. Following each value statement are recommendations we believe are necessary to achieve cultural change over the long-term, and recommendations for specific actions that we believe will create needed near-term improvements in performance at the Department Manager level. We want to emphasize that, while some incremental improvement can be achieved by implementing the specific actions, change in our overall N&HS cultural needs to change to prevent the next serious event.

"YOU NEVER GET A TRAFFIC LIGHT UNTIL A CERTAIN NUMBER OF PEOPLE HAVE DIED!"

Rigby Cop

—SICILIANO

1. I want to work in an organization where I have a ***reasonable*** span of control over the management of personnel, resources, project execution, communications, security, safety and risk.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CULTURAL IMPROVEMENTS

a. Define the general elements and specifics associated with span of control (define parameters, e.g., risk, location, tenure, etc.)
b. Ability to assign resources to assume delegated responsibility to equitably share and ensure effective cognizance of duties
c. Examine and identify resources that could be designated/budgeted resources for an assigned responsibility *(WE SHOULD CLARIFY THIS – IT SOUNDS LIKE THE "COMMON FUNCTIONS" RESOURCE POOL, THEREFORE IS WORTH PUTTING IN AS A SPECIFIC ACTION)*
d. Input into budget planning
e. Define the reasonable scope of a Department Manager and associated charging practices
[redacted])

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO CREATE NEAR-TERM IMPROVEMENTS EFFECTIVENESS OF DEPARTMENT MANAGERS:

- Define span of control and what is needed to manage it effectively
- Develop, publish, and adhere to a laboratory and NHS calendar with specific deadlines. Example entries are: annual reviews, merits and promotions, annual training, budget planning, and LDRD.
- Roll out SIPRNET.
- Allocate instant recognition awards to the Department Managers for distribution at the department level. Establish allocations based on the number of personnel assigned to that department. Establish a small reserve for team awards at the Directorate level

- Establish tools to be implemented at the Department Manager level to develop and retain personnel resources

- Establish authority for the following actions to the Department Managers:
  - Acceptance of work and work package review with briefings to the Directors on scope and progress
  - Hiring for department level positions
  - Assignment of resources to assume delegated responsibility to equitably share and ensure effective cognizance of duties

- Allow DM's to provide input to budget planning

- Allow DM's the opportunity to provide input to developing solutions for problems and process improvement (policy and procedure decisions)

- Develop a reliable means to synchronize financial information near real time to track expenditures and budgets. As long as we have our current system in place we will continue to have overruns.

- Develop a strategy and priority for assignment of resources between competing departments and programs. An example in the Materials group is a by-name request for a cyber resource and 2 additional cyber FTE's (various skill sets, not individuals) for a total of three FTE's to contribute to a highly classified project/effort for 5 years.

2. I want to work in an organization that sets reasonable and clearly defined expectations upon myself as a manager/supervisor so that I can accomplish my tasks in a timely and efficient manner. The amount of work that I have should be near equal to the amount of time I have to accomplish it. I want my time and efforts to be ***value added, always***, and I want to ***DIVEST*** from efforts that do not add value to the organization. I want my lines of authority clearly defined and supported ([redacted] does a great job on this!). — Siciliano

a. Draft a capacity management construct, that provides accountability and prioritization
b. Develop a workable "Divestiture" process
c. Hold a trade-off discussion (between the Directors and the Department Managers) to identify real priorities and risks.
d. Perform Job Task Analyses for Department Managers
[redacted]

SPECIFIC ACTIONS FOR IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS OF DEPARTMENT MANAGERS:

- Conduct Job Task Analysis of all management positions (this will provide data to support requests for additional funding, appropriate delegation of authority, determinations of priority for manager activities, and development of a common cost model)

- Develop clear roles for support personnel that assist Department Managers in doing their jobs rather than developing additional tasking for managers, e.g., site plan for UB3, burn chamber install, additional security requirements, hazardous chemical storage increase in IEDF/UB3, etc.

- Divest from the following tasking/requirements as the value added is minimal and the cost in time further reduces the ability of the manager to fulfill all of his/her management responsibilities:

- Mandatory daily/weekly checks of sign in cards conducted by managers responsible for classified spaces. Reduce the requirement to spot checks or assign all of the checks to the Security Lead
- Department Manager being responsible for TDP notification. Let the medical department handle it. They can notify the individual just as easily as we can
- Department Manager approval of "safety shoe vouchers" and the other such items. Delegate it to the PM level, or have the individual justify it in the request and let the safety shoe guy approve it. If there are any questions, then the DM can get involved. I've never disapproved a safety shoe voucher.
- Establish a team of personnel and a process to review and approve all proposed solutions for security problems and issues. The team makeup should be small (e.g., 5-7) and include key managers, security leaders, and senior level program personnel with in-depth and varied security experience. *("SUGGESTING TO SEND A LONG TIME CLIENT HOME ON A PLANE BECAUSE SHE BROUGHT A CELL PHONE INTO A SCIF, WHICH WAS CAUGHT QUICKLY WITH NO COMPROMISE, IS A KNEE JERK REACTION. THANK GOODNESS REASON OVERCAME THE SUGGESTION, BUT THE POINT NEEDS TO BE MADE" (MARK S EXAMPLE). – GOOD POINT; SHOULD WE CHANGE THE LANGUAGE A LITTLE?)* – SICILIANO
- Adopt a business posture that balances the importance of the customer's mission and our privilege in doing the nation's work, and the need to conduct work at INL in compliance with our contractual requirements and with respect for all of INL's missions.

3. I want to work in an organization built upon principles of trust and mutual respect where my experience and leadership are valued and where mission success ***is more important than any individual's appearance to their boss***, and that's at every level. I want to be able to provide input, even if it's not in line with more senior leadership's opinion, without fear of reprisal. Trust, respect and confidence are not germane to a position or title, they must be earned up and down the chain of command. I want my leadership to support me when I'm right and give guidance and direction when I'm wrong. – SICILIANO

a. ***Develop basic ground rules for discussing issues and changes in meetings (acceptable, unacceptable)***
b. Utilize 3rd parties (non-N&HS) to observe and offer corrective guidance in discussionsor forums prone to volatility, etc.
c. Reinforce the authorities intended to Department Managers, and provide clear explanations when authority is withheld/overridden (ASSEMBLE LIST OF PRIOR EXAMPLES)
d. ***Provide the Department Managers with clear guidance of the "up-the-chain" information needs, hot-buttons, level of detail, etc. (Need Directors to provide to Managers)***
e. Perform trending data for exceptions and operations impact

(Mark Sicillano, [redacted])

SPECIFIC ACTIONS FOR IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS OF DEPARTMENT MANAGERS:

- Institute a mechanism to quickly communicate decisions, with rationale, from the directors.

- Establish and implement a requirement for meeting minutes of all meetings. Minutes should include as a minimum:
  - List of attendees
  - Key topics discussed
  - Decisions made
  - Rationale/basis for decisions

- Implement the following actions to foster an environment that allows open discussion at all N&HS management levels and allows expression different opinions and observations to address issues and develop solutions to problems:

- Develop a common meeting format to enrich our discussions and make the time spent valuable to improving my performance
- Develop basic ground rules for conducting discussions of issues and changes in meetings with examples of what's acceptable and what's unacceptable
- Utilize 3rd parties (non-N&HS) to observe and offer corrective guidance in discussions or forums prone to volatility, etc.
- Develop clear guidance for basic information requirements up-the-chain, including but not limited to needs, hot-buttons, level of detail

- We will have different opinions and observations than our directors, ALD and LD. We should feel free to discuss our opposing points of view even when they are contentious.
- When communicating with the organization, make it routine that both successes and shortfalls be discussed with equal levels of importance. We want to be held responsible and accountable for both, and we should make it a point to learn from both.

4. I want to work in an environment where there is mutual and clear understanding of the criteria against which we make decisions, perform our roles as managers and execute our tasks. Then, I want to be empowered at my level to make the decisions that should be made at my level and not be second guessed. -SICILIANO

5. I want to work in an organization in which my leadership makes good and timely decisions, and is not afraid of making decisions. Indecisiveness erodes confidence. I want my leadership to LEAD (have vision) and explain why we are going in the directions we are and then give us the tools to get there. -SICILIANO

<u>4/5 actions</u>:

a. Develop an N&HS decision-making model/process that includes criteria, time-lines, accountabilities, communications, exceptions
b. Clarify and discuss the operationalizing of N&HS's strategy, priorities, linkage and criteria for decision-making
c. Ensure responsibility and decision authority go hand-in-hand
([redacted]) +1 Director(?)

- Develop tools to facilitate decision making in a timely manner and include assessment of risk and cost to own (e.g., software engineers in Defense Systems on bridge time – what are my responsibilities/actions if they go or if they stay)

6. I want my leadership to be responsive to suggestions to improve our capabilities-- security, safety, business, coordination/deconfliction, execution, client relationships, professional growth, etc. We provided good solutions to mitigate some of our security risks back in February. I believe we would be far better off today if those ideas / suggestions were implemented. We have been waiting for YEARS to get SIPRNET up and running. Several infractions could have been avoided with that alone. -SICILIANO

a. Develop and utilize an approach for tracking issues, progress and change or closure (traceability)
b. Discuss ideas for enriching our meetings to add value
c. Communicate considerations, influences, factors and results
- Provide examples
([redacted] Mark)

- Implement process that integrates all levels of management for developing improvements and corrective actions that have cross-divisional impacts
- Identify and implement improvements and corrective actions in a timely manner.
- Provide Department Managers the tools needed to correct deficiencies and shortfalls in their own departments.

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS THAT CUT ACROSS ALL VALUE STATEMENTS:

- ***Exchange and discussion of needs and expectations between Directors and Department Managers***
- Clarify and operationalize our business model(s)
  - Develop a Strategy flowdown
  - Prioritize efforts
- [redacted]***distribute N&HS LMT meeting minutes***
- Develop communication process (mutually understood) for informing Department Managers of priorities, changes, bump plan
- Utilize portals within NHS to communicate with staff
- Identify when outside help is needed, and utilize accordingly
- Develop an N&HS specific staffing process

DEPARTMENT MANAGER REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FROM DIRECTORS

- A strong recommendation was made in ***May of 2008*** to hold personnel accountable for security infractions. The recommendation included a graded and reasonable approach that included official documentation all the way to forfeiture of pay. A conscious decision was made by senior leadership NOT to implement this. This recommendation was again proposed **along with many other suggestions in February 2009**. No feedback was provided on any of these proposed solutions (communications break down) other than DOE said the guards needed to be funded with direct, if I remember correctly. Since the first bullet in the MSA indicated that Department Managers' lack of oversight resulted in many of our security deficiencies, please help us understand the criteria in which our senior leadership came to these conclusions/lack of action that set us up for failure. —Siciliano

- Many of us view the MSA mostly as a failure. The reason the MSA was initiated, as explained to us, was due to the increase in ***security*** infractions and to help us improve our ***security*** performance. Yet, instead of being a security focused event, it mutated into a soup to nuts approach to fix every perceived problem within NHS. We focused more on project management than on security improvement. It appears to most of us that we took our eye off the ball. Please explain the criteria and decision making that resulted in this.

- We have rolled something out called the SPS net. This is a network, as I understand it, which allows us to communicate up to the SECRET level—amongst ourselves. Please explain the costs associated with this (it's not complete) and what capability it brings to us that couldn't be accomplished with a SIPRNET system? Help me understand why we will be maintaining two incompatible systems, how this decision was made, and why.

BOTTOM LINE: The fundamental philosophy of leadership, as it pertains to National and Homeland Security, needs to change at the top before there will be any hope of improvement within the ranks.

[redacted]

08/24/2009 10:55 AM

To Mark D Siciliano/SICIMD/CC01/INEEL/US@INEL
cc
bcc
Subject Re: Fw: Do you know what Curahee means?

History: This message has been replied to and forwarded.

Mark - You did a great job in the meeting Friday. Thank you on behalf of all of us. You truly keep what is important (Curahee) and the work products were are putting out there, in perspective with the absurd minutia. It doesn't necessarily make it easier, but at least we know that our leader understands what is truly important and isn't afraid to vocalize on our behalf.

Thank you.
[redacted]

Mark D Siciliano/SICIMD/CC01/INEEL/US
12/01/2009 04:11 PM

To [redacted]
cc Mark D Siciliano/SICIMD/CC01/INEEL/US
bcc
Subject Fw: For the record: Fw: "MANDATORY MEETING WITH ACTING ALD" 21 AUG 09 @ UB-2 CONF RM 250

[redacted]

FYI, from a colleague that was also at the meeting where [redacted] addressed us. I'm glad I had the opportunity to speak with [redacted] about this a few weeks after it happened.

Mark

Idaho National Laboratory

Mark Siciliano, Department Manager, Special Programs
National & Homeland Security Directorate
Idaho National Laboratory
P.O. Box 1625, MS-3520, Idaho Falls, ID 83415-3520
O: 208-526-4464, C: 208-360-4367, STE: 208-526-4464
Email: Mark.Siciliano@inl.gov
SIPR: sicilimd@idaho.doe.sgov.gov, IC: idsicmd@doe.ic.gov
(Please call/email if a time critical msg sent to SIPRNET)

—— Forwarded by Mark D Siciliano/SICIMD/CC01/INEEL/US on 12/01/2009 04:08 PM ——

Idaho National Laboratory

[redacted]
09/02/2009 11:24 AM

To [redacted]
cc
Subject For the record: Fw: "MANDATORY MEETING WITH ACTING ALD" 21 AUG 09 @ UB-2 CONF RM 250

[redacted]

Thanks for sharing the feedback from this meeting and also from last week's PM IWFO/CWFO meeting. This is just to document my feedback to you so there is a record I have communicated it to Leadership.

MANDATORY MEETING WITH ACTING ALD - Feedback from you.

From your discussion I understand that the three Division Directors, [redacted] as the acting ALD, were not pleased with how the interaction of the overall meeting progressed. I also understand that they reflected their thoughts, positive and negative, to [redacted], our ALD, directly prior to discussion with you.

I also understand from you that [redacted] did not feel my behavior was correct and that [redacted] and [redacted] had to "save" me from [redacted] receiving only a negative impression from Derek.

Positive Thoughts - My mentioning of positive safety cultures in [redacted] group and other suggestions that can be implemented, I presume this to be the ATR metal detector comment.

Negative thoughts - I did not adequately support [redacted] as his discussion received negative feedback, that I should have intervened to support [redacted] message and theme.

My documented reaction. This is absolute unprofessional rubbish. None of those Division Directors asked to talk to me about helping with their message prior to delivery. Their message was all negative, diluted, and not well tailored to the audience. The responsibility of the message effectiveness is the Sender's, in this case [redacted]

[redacted] as has all the LMT, told all the Department Managers they were pretty much worthless in May 2009. To ask today for a Department Manager to support another unfocused security message that they have not been privy to is a violation of every Leadership principle in L2L and every other document I have read, or more importantly lived, on the topic. You demonstrated in your staff meeting appropriate Leader behavior for socializing messages prior to communicating with my department's staff, i thank you again.

The LMT (yourself excluded) did not listen to DM's before, during or after the MSA in regards to fixing security. The MSA picked the wrong projects, why of 11 Department Managers and numerous projects were two selected within my Department, pure unadulterated bias with a perceived intent to validate a suspicion. The findings of the MSA are quite stinging personally as I documented the dilemmas in the organization as a PAI which fell on deaf ears of so called Leadership.

Post MSA the LMT removed the DMs from the process and developed corrective actions all by themselves. They alone are responsible for the failure of the MSA and the CAP to properly focus on root causes of SECURITY issues and fix them. We the DM's have executed their CAP actions, even improved them (Project Quads), as the LMT continues to demonstrate they do not meet the Lab's expectations as understanding their organizations and people as described in POL 111. You alone stand out among the LMT as someone familiar with the large known void between the INL procedures and N&HS operations. I have sent other emails where, when I volunteered my own time to help fix the restart criteria, I was treated unprofessionally and told the "experts" already had it covered. I have proven these "experts" were not and they did not meet the POL 111 expectations.

In summary, I feel [redacted] could be retaliating against my statement to him about "being attacked by a Navy Seal" and/or my previous engagement with him on hiring where he did not appreciate me calling him on facts, particularly ones he stated that were documented falsehoods.

PM Meeting feedback - I saw your page while I was in with three DOE ID personnel covering important Security approavls for an upcoming IO Range event. Your page stated that I should come to the PM meeting after I was done, I did.

From your discussion I understand that the ALD was disappointed in no Department Managers being there. I understand that some feel I could have disengaged with my meeting to attend your meeting with Program Managers which the other Division Directors and ALD attended.

My documented reaction. This is illogical and unprofessional. The meeting I had scheduled with [redacted]-ID, the Designated Accreditation Authority for INL's unclassified networks, and Ms. [redacted], our ALD's DOE ID peer, and [redacted], DOE-ID, was scheduled for over two weeks. This meeting had many hours of pre-briefings for BEA/DOE ID for a critical **precedence** setting approval by [redacted] To expect that I would reschedule this is unprofessional, even more so when this expectation was not communicated to me prior. Enough said.

Summary :
I continue to be deeply saddened and disheartened, having worked so hard to improve things here before, during and after the MSA to be treated like this. Even worse i know this is light compared to how our good employees have been and will be treated in an unprofessional manner.

Have a good day

[redacted]

— Forwarded by [redacted] on 09/01/2009 09:00 AM —

[redacted] To [redacted]

EL/US
08/23/2009 07:48 AM

cc Mark D Siciliano/SICIMD/CC01/INEEL/US@INEL
Subject Fw: "MANDATORY MEETING WITH ACTING ALD" 21 AUG 09 @ UB-2 CONF RM 250

[redacted]

I mentioned this meeting on the phone. This is for the record.

[redacted] and [redacted] came over.

[redacted] spoke to the group and covered the severity of security incidents and the recent one at UB2. [redacted] was The entire starting portion of his presentation was negative though there are employees who have done, and continue to do, the right thing in regards to security before and after the recent spike in issues.

[redacted] presented some excellent points with passion and I remain disappointed at Leaderships reaction to this input and all others provided by the group. [redacted] was immediately defensive and tried to justify his, and other's actions to date. In one case even saying the point raised by an employee was irrelevant.

[redacted] approached me afterwards and asked what I thought of his presentation. [redacted] was present. I politely (and I mean politely) related that I felt most of his opening was negative and did not acknowledge the hard work of many in the room. [redacted] immediately became defensive of his speech and efforts. In this discussion he stated "" I did not expect to get Attacked by a Navy Seal"

I immediately asked [redacted] to be careful of his words. [redacted] tried to blow off his statement. I let [redacted] know that I did not think his words were appropriately that I have had many folks use the term. It appears your discussion with [redacted] the last time he used "hostile" was ineffective.

[redacted] spoke as well yet did not come off as genuine to me in his accpetance of responsibility for the majority of issues, rather the message received was " all these actions reflect badly on me"

Let me know any other information you require.

You should speak to [redacted] she was quite upset yesterday.

This description is ot fully complete but should serve to inform you of how your Division was treated on Friday.

Sincerely

[redacted]

—Forwarded by [redacted] on 08/23/2009 07:15 AM —

[redacted]
08/21/2009 01:58 PM

To [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Mark D Siciliano/SICIMD/CC01/INEEL/US@INEL, [redacted]

cc [redacted]

Subject "MANDATORY MEETING WITH ACTING ALD" 21 AUG 09 @ UB-2 CONF RM 250

[redacted]

UB-2 Residents & Others:

We have all been invited to a "MANDATORY MEETING" with the Acting ALD at UB-2, Conf Rm 250 from 3:30 P.M. to 4:00 P.M. 21 Aug 09.

Thanks,
[redacted]

NOTE - IT WAS PUT OUT AS Policy AFTER THIS MEETING THAT There would be A MANDATORY "PAUSE" AFTER A Security INCIDENT TO DISCUSS IT & The AID or his ACTING would convene the meeting. No problem EXCEPT IT NEVER HAPPENED. AND Ther have been 3-4 more INCIDENTS SINCE THEN. TO my Knowledge The only TIME THIS HAPPENED WAS when IT INVOLVED my DEPARTMENT. NO INFRACTIONS ISSUED.

Why WAS my DEPARTMENT & [redacted] SINGLED OUT? There has only been 1 meeting like this to my KNOWLEDGE.